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I. Introduction
On June 22, 1982, the Department of Commerce, at the
direction of President Reagan and pursuant to Section 6 of
the Export Administration Act, amended Sections 376. 12, 379.
and 385.2 of the Export Administration Regulations. These
amendments amounted to an expansion of the existing U.
controls on the export and re-export of goods and technical
data relating to oil and gas exploration , exploitation,
transmission and refinement.
The European Community believes that the U. S. regulations, as
amended, contain sweeping extens~o~s of U. S. jurisdiction which
are unlawful under international law. Moreover, the new regu-
lations and the way in which they affect contracts, in course
of performance, seem 'bo. run counter to criteria of the Export
Administration Act. and also to certain principles of U.
pub1 ic law.
The main thrust of the regulations may be summarized as
follows:
First of all, persons within a third country may not re-export
machinery for the exploration,  production, transmission or
refinement of oil and natural gas, or components thereof, if
it is of U. S. origin, without permission of the U.S. Government.
Moreover, any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United- 2 -
states (1) is required to get prior written authorization f~om
the Office of Export Administration for export and re-export
to the U. R. of non-U.S. goods and technical data related
to oil and gas exploration, production, transmission and
refinement.
Finally, no person in the U. S.  or in a foreign country may
export or re-export to the U. S .R. foreign products directly
derived from U. S. technical data (2) relating to machinery etc.
utilized for the exploration, production or transmission or
refinement of petroleum or natural. gas or commodities produced
in plants based on such U. S. technical data.
This prohibition applies in three alternative situations, namely:
if written assurance was requirea under the U. S. Export
Regulations when the data were exported;
/ .
(1) Now defined as (I) any person wherever located who is a citdzen ,
or resident of the United State.s; (II) any person actually
within the United States; (III) any corporation organized
under the laws of the United States; or (IV) any partnership,
association, corporation or other organization, wherever or-
ganized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by
persons specified in paragraphs (I), (II) or (III)
(2) This expression is very broadly defined in 15 CFR para.
379.- 3 -
if any person subject to the jurisdiction of the U. A. (as
defined in Note (3) ) receives royalties or other compensation
for, or has licensed, the use of the technical data concerned,
regardless of when the data were exported from the U.
if the recipient Of the U.S. technical data agreed (in the
licensing agreement or other contracts) to abide by U.
Export Control Regulations.
The following comments will discuss  firstly the international
legal aspects of the U.S. measures, including (A) the generally
recognized bases on which jurisdiction can be founded in inter-
national law and (B) other bases of jurisdiction which might be
invoked by the U. S. Government;  secondly, the rules and principles
as laid down in U. S. law, in particular the Export Administration
Act, and as applied by U. S. Courts, .which would seem to be at
variance with the amendments of ji:me 22, 1982.
/ .
(3) Now defined as (I) any person wherever located who is a
citizen or resident of the United States; (II) any person
actually within the United States; (III) any corporation
organized under the laws of the United States or of any
State, Territory, Possession or District of the United
States; or (IV) any partnership, association, corporation
or other organization, wherever organized or doing business,
that is owned or controlled by persons specified in para-
graphs (I), (II) or (III)- 4 -
II. The Amendments under International Law
Generally Accepted Bases of Jurisdiction in International
Law
The U.S. measures as they apply in the present case are
unacceptable under international law because of their extra-
territorial aspects. They seek to regulate companies not of
s. nationality in respect of their conduct outside the United
states and particularly the handling of property and technical
data of these companies not wi thin the United States.
They seek to impose on non-U. S. companies the restriction of
S. law by threatening them with ~~scriminat6ry sanctions in
the field of trade which are in.eQnsistent with the normal
commercial practice established between the U. s. and the E.
In this way the amendments of June 22, 1982, run counter to
the two generally accepted bases of jurisdiction in international
law: the territoriality and the nationality principles (4) .
The territoriality principle (i.e. the notion that a State
should restrict its rule-making in principle to persons and goods
within its territory and that an organization like the European
Community should restrict the applicability of its rule to the
territory to which the Treaty setting it up applies) is a
fundamental notion of international law, in particular insofar
as it concerns the regulation of the social and economic activity
in a State. The principle that each state and muta tis mutandis
the Community insofar as powers have been transferred to it -- 5 -
has the right freely to organize and develop its social and
economic system has been confirmed many times in international
fora. The American measures clearly infringe the principle of
te.rri toriality, since they purport to regulate the activities
of companies in theE.C., not under the territorial competence
of the U.
The nationality principle (i.e. the prescription of rules
for nationals, wherever they are) cannot serve as a basis for
the extension of u.s. jurisdiction resulting from the amendments,
e. (I) over companies incorporated in E.C. Member States, on
the basis of some corporate link (parent-subsidiary) or personal
link (e.g. shareho1ding) to the U.S., (II) over companies in-
corporated inE.C. Member States, either because they have a
tie to a U. S . -incorporated company, .subsidiary or other fl
controlled" company through a l:tc~nsing agreement, royalty
payments, or payment of other compensation, or because they have
bought certain goods originating in the U.
Ad (I) Ifhe amendments in two places purport to subject to
s. jurisdiction companies, wherever organized or doing business,
which are subsidiaries of U. S. companies or under the control of
S. citizens, U. S. residents or even persons actually within
the u. S. This implies that the United States is seeking to impose
its corporate nationality on companies of which the great majority
are incorporated and have their registered office elsewhere,
notably in E.C. Member States.
Such action is not in conformity wi threcognized principles of
international law. In the  Barcelona Traction case. the International
./ .- 6 -
court of Justice declared that two traditional criteria for
determining the nationality of companies, i.e. the place of
incorporation and the place of the registered office of the
company concerned, had been flconfirmed by 3.ong practice and
by numerous international instruments . The Court also
scrutinized other tests of .corporate nationality, but con-
cluded that these had not found general acceptance. The Court
consequently placed primary emphasis on the place of incorporation
and the registered office in deciding the case in point (5) .
This decision was taken within the framework of the doctrine of
diplomatic protection, but reflects a general principle of
international law.
Ad (II) The notion inheren~ in the subjection to U.S. juris-
diction of companies with no tie to the U. S. whatsoever, except
for a technological link to a U. S. company, or through possession
of U. S . origin goods, can only be that this technology or such
goods should somehow be considered as unalterably "American
(even though many of the patents involved are registered in the
Member States of the European Community). This seems the only
possible explanation for the U. s. regulations given the fact
that national security is not at stake here (see below under B) 
Goods and technology do not have any nationality and there are
no known rules under international law for using ~oods or
technology situated ~broad as a basis of establishing jurisdiction
over the persons controlling them. Several Court cases confirm
that U. s. jurisdiction does not follow U. S. origin goods once
they have been di scharged in the te rri tory of another country (6) .The amendments of 22 June 1982, therefore, cannot be justi-
fied under the nationality principle, because they ignore the
two criteria for determining the nationality of companies re-
confirmed by the International Court of JUstice and because they
purport to give SOme notion of "nationality" to goods and
technologies so as to establish jurisdiction over persons handling
them.
The purported direct extension of U.S. juris.diction to non-U .
incorporated companies not using U. S. origin technology or com-
ponents is  a fortiori objectionable to the E.C. because neither
of these (in themselves invalid) justifications could apply.
10. The last mentioned case exemplifies to what extent the whole-
sale infringement of the nationality principle exacerbates the
infringement of the territoriali.ty principle 0) . Thus even E.C .
incorporated companies in the example mentioned above, according
to the amendments, would have to ask special written permission
not of the E.C. but of the U.S. authorities in order to obtain
permission to export goods produced in theE . C. and based on
C. technology from the territory, to which the E.C. Treaties
apply, to the U. R. The practical impact of the amendments to
the Export Administration Regulations is that E.C. companies are
pressed into service to carry out u.S. trade policy towards the
U. S . S . R., even though these companies are incorporated and have
their registered office within the Community which has its own
trade policy towards the U.
/ .
the
(7) The application of/nationality principle would imply ipso facto some overlapping with the application of the Terri-
tor1a ity principle and this is acceptable under international
law, in some instances, but we are not in such a situation
in this case- 0 -
The public policy (flordre public ) of the European community
and of its Member States is thus purportedly replaced by U.
public policy which European companies are forced to carry out
within the E.C., if they are not to lose export privileges in
the U. s. or to face other sanctions. This is an unacceptable
interference in the affairs of the European Community.
11. Furthermore, it is reprehensible that present U.S. regula-
tions encourage non-U. s. companies to submit "vol untarily
to this kind of mobilization for u. s. purposes. Even when sub-
mission to a foreign boycott is entirely voluntary, such sub-
mission within the U.S. has been considered to be undesirable
and contrary to u. s. public po1icy (8) . By the same token, 
must have been evident to the u. s. Government that the statutory
encouragement of voluntary submJE;sion to U.S. public policy in
trade matters  within the E .C. is strongly condemned by the
European Community. Private agreements should not be used in
this way as instrument.s of foreign policy. If a government in
law and in fact s~stematical1y encourages the inclusion of such
submission clauses in private contracts, freedom of contracts
is misused in order to circumvent the limits imposed on national
jurisdiction by international law.
It is self-evident, moreover, that the existence of such sub-
mission clauses in certain private contracts cannot serve as
a basis for U. S. regulatory jurisdiction which can properly be
exercised solely in conformity with international law. Nor can
a company prevent a State from objecting to any infringement
which might occur, of the jurisdiction of the State to which it
belongs.
/ .
(8) Cf. Section 8 of the Export Administration Act and below
under I!.Other Bases of Jurisdiction
12. There are two other bases of jurisdiction which might be
invoked by the U. S. Government, but which have found less than
general acceptance under international law. These are:
(a) the protective principle (para. 33 of the 2nd Restatement),
which would give a State jurisdiction to proscribe acts
done outside its territory but threatening its security
or the operation of its governmental functions, if such
acts are generally recognized as crimes by States with
reasonably developed legal systems;
(b) the so-called "effects doctrine , under which conduct
occurring outside the territory but causing direct,
foreseeable and substantial effects - which are also
constituent elements of a crime or tort - within the
terri tory may be proscribed (para. 18 of the 2nd Re-
statement) .
13. However, it is clear ab initio that the extension of U.
jurisdiction implicit in the amendments cannot be based on
the principles mentioned under 12 (a) or (b).
The "protective principle" has not been invoked by the U.
Government, since the amendments are based on Section 6 (Foreign
policy Controls) and not on Section 5 (National Security Controls)
of the Export Administration Act. The U.S. Government itself,
therefore, has not sought to base the amendments on considerations
of national security.
The "effects doctrine" is not applicable. It cannot conceivably
/ .be argued that exports from the European Community to the
R. for the Siberian gas pipeline have within the U.
direct, foreseeable and substantial effects which are not
merely undesirable, but which constitute an element of a crime
or tort proscribed by U.S. law. It is more than likely that
they have no direct effects on U. S. trade.
14. For the reasons expounded above, it is clear that the U.
measures of June 22, 1982 do not find a valid basis in any of
the generally recognized - or even the more controversial -
principles of international law governing State jurisdiction
to prescribe rules. As a matter of fact the measures by their
extra-territorial character simultaneously infringe the terri-
toria1ity and nationality principles of jurisdi~tion and are
therefore unlawful under international law.
/ .III. The Amendments under U. S . Law
U. S. Reactions to Measures Similar to the June 22
A.TIiendments
15. If a foreign country were to take measures like the
June 22 Amendments, it is doubtful whether they would be
in conformity with u. s. law and th:ey would therefore
probably not be recognized and enforced by U. S. Courts.
The kind of mobilization of E. C. companies for u. s. purposes
to which the Community objects was subject to strong
American reactions and legislative counter-measures, when
, U. S. companies were similarly mobilized for the foreign
policy purposes of other States.
The anti-foreign-boycottprovisions of Section 8 of the
Export Administration Act are testimony to that~ In the same
way as the U. S. could not accept ~at its companies were
turned into instruments of the foreign policy of other
nations, the E.C. cannot accept that its companies must follow
another trade policy than its own within its own territorial
jurisdiction.
It is noteworthy that the anti-boycott provisions of the
Export Administration Act can be invoked in response to a
boycott that takes a less direct form than the June 22
Amendments, namely a boycott which merely tries to dissuade
persons from dealing with a third country by refusing to trade
with such persons. An export restriction patterned on the
June 22 Amendments, in contrast, would directly prohibit a
person from dealing with a particular country under the threat
of government-imposed penalties. Therefore, the latest
amendments would appear to be even more far-reaching than a
/ ..". 12 -
boycott which might give rise to the application of the
anti -boycott provis ions.
16. Even if for some reason the foreign boycott provisions
of the Export Administration Act we+e not considered app1i-
cable, a foreign country imposing such restrictions as those
imposed by the June 22 Amendments would probably be viewed by
S. Courts as attempting to extend its law beyond its
territory without suff.icient nexus with the U. S. entity to
justify such an extension. This certainly would be the case
with respect to a mere licensee of a foreign concern.
If a foreign government complained that aU. S. licensee of a
foreign company was not complying with that foreign govern-
n:eJl1!s .export restrictions prohibiting such exports, aU. s.
Federal Court would decline jurisdiction, because U. s. Courts
will not enforce foreign penal statutes !9)
If the observance of a foreign export control by aU. S.
subsidiary or licensee were to become an issue in litigation
between the latter and its foreign parent company or licensor,
a Federal or State .court would probably not refuse jurisdiction,
but would decline to enforce the export restrictions of the
foreign country on the grounds that it would be contrary to
the strong public policy of the forum and not in the interest
of the United States to do so. (10)
. / .
(9)  Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Company , 127 u. s. 265, 290
(1888), Restatement (2nd) conflict of laws para. 89.
(10) Restatement (2nd) para. 90.,. 13 
..,
This being the reaction of the U.S. legislator and judiciary
to foreign measures comparable to its own measures of June 22,
the U. S. government should not have inflicted these measures
on the E. C. companies concerned, in the virtual knowledge that
these measures would be regarded as unlawful and ineffective
by public authorities in the E.
Conflict.s of Jurisdiction and Accommodation of Interest
17. In cases where the conflicting exercise of jurisdiction
to prescribe leads to conflicts of enforcement jurisdiction
between States, each State, according to para. 40 of the
Restatement (2nd) Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., is
required by international law to consider, in good faith,
moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction. In
this connection, the following factors should be considered:
A) Vi tal national interests of each of the States;.
B) The extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
C) The extent to which the required conduct is to take place
in the territor~ of the other State,
D) The nationality of the other person... fl
17. Over the past years various u.S. Courts of Appeal have
pronounced themselves in favour of this "balancing of interests
approach.
In the case of the Timber1ane Co. v. Bank of America (11 )
. / .
(11)  Timber1ane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America , 1977-1, Trade
cases No. 61. 233"" 14
....
Judge Choy suggested that comity demanded an evaluation and
balancing of relevant factors, and continued:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict
with foreign law or policy, the nationality of allegiance of
the parties, and the locations or principal places of businesses
or corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either State
can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance
of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere,
the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the
relative importance to the violations charged of conduct wi thin
the United States as compared with conduct abroad"
A similar approach was followed in Mannington Mills (12) and
is set out in paragraph 40 of the second Restatement.
19. Although this "balancing of interest" approach applies
in the first place to Courts, th.!3J;"e are good reasons why
the u. S. government should exercise such restraint already
at the rule-making stage.
20. First, section 6 of the Export Administration Act
several places enjoins the President to consider the position
of other countries before taking or extending export controls.
Thus para. (b): if.. . the President shall consider: (3) the
reaction of other countries to the imposition or expansion of
.. . export controls by the United States
. / .
(12)  Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congo1eum Corp. 1979-1 Trade
cases No. 62. 547-- 15 -
In para. (d): "... the President shall determine that reasonable
efforts have been made to achieve the purposes of the controls
through negotiation or other alternative means
Finally in para. (g): H .. . the President shall take all feasible
steps to initiate and conclude negotiations for the purpose of
securing the cooperation of such foreign governments in con-
trolling the export to countries and consignees to which the
U 0 S 0 export controls apply of any goods or technology comparable
to goods or technology controlled under this section
21. In the second place, these amendments to the Export
Administration regulations may not be subject to substantive
judicial review. This means that U. s. Courts may not be able
to apply their balancing of interests approach in a c1.ash of
enforcement jurisdictions. It is therefore appropriate for the
Executive to apply it at the rule-making stage.
22. Finally, the direction in which informed legal opinion
in the U. S. is moving on this issue is demonstrated by the
new draft  Restatement (3rd) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
It does away with the rather artificial distinction between
the right to assert a jurisdiction to prescribe and restraint
in exercising it. It simply considers that the exercise of a
jurisdiction to prescribe may be unreasonable. To decide whether
this is so or not, draft para. 403 (13) enjoins the evaluation
of such factors as place of the activity to be regulated, links
of persons falling under the regulation with other States,
/ .
(13) Cited in Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at
a Crossroads: an Intersection between Public and Private
International Law, 76 American Journal of International Law
1982, 280, at 300-301.- 16 -
consistency with the traditions of the international system,
interests of other States in regulating the activity concerned,
and the existence of justified expectations to be affected by
the regulation.
23. Whatever approach is adopted by the u. s. governement in
balancing u. S. interests against the interests of the European
Community, the following considerations have been neglected:
- The interest of the European Community in regulating the
foreign trade of the nationals of the Member States, in the
territory to which the Community Treaties apply is paramount
over any foreign policy purposes that a third country may
have.
The conduct required by the amendments is to take place
largely in territory to which the E.C. Treaties apply and
not in u.s. territory.
- The nationality and other ties of ~any persons whose conduct
is purportedly regulated by th- June 22 Amendments link them
primarily to E. C. Member States and not to the u.
- There are justified expectations on the part of E.C. companies
which are seriously li'urt by the u.  S. measures.
Criteria under Section 6 (b) of the Export Administration Act
24. It can hardly be claimed that the u. s. measures satisfy
the criteria laid down in the Export Administration Act, and
therefore it is doubtful whether the restrictions are properly
applied in terms of U. S. law. Criterion 1 refers to the proba-
bility that the controls will achieve the intended foreign policy
purposes. Soviet authorities have clearly stated their intention
to deliver gas to Western Europe as scheduled, and there is little
reason to doubt their ability to do so, even without American or
European equipment, since the existing Soviet pipeline system
. / .... 17 -
already has sufficient spare capacity, at least to cover the
requirements of the early phases of the programme of deliveries.
If the pipeline is built with Soviet technology and the gas
flows on time, these U. S. exports controls are at best ineffect-
p~licy .
ual, and may well be self-defeating, as instruments of foreign
25. Criterion 3 requires that the reaction of other countries
to the imposition or expansion of such export controls be take.
into account. In view of the extra-territorial application, and
retroactive effect of the U. S. measures, the European Community
cannot fail to denounce the measure as unlawful under inter-
national law, and in view of their damaging economic and
political consequences, has already protested in the strongest
terms.
26. Criterion 4 requires consideration .
of the effects of the
proposed controls on the export 
p~r~orrnance of the United States.
Here again, confirmation of the u.
s. measure~ despite Criterion
~ would involve complete disregard for damaging effect~!
not only
immediately, but also in ~he longer term, owing to the grave
doubts that are boun~ to arise in future about the 
U. S. as a
reliable supplier of equipment under contract, or as a reliable
partner in technology-licensing arrangements. This danger has
already been pointed out to the President of the United States
by the U. S. Chamber of Commer.ce.
Com ensation for Dama e Re.sul tin from u. S. Measures
27. The U. S. measures inasmuch as they refer to exports from
countries outside the U. S. , are all the more obj ectionable, as
they affect contracts that were free from restrictions imposed
bu the U. S. authorities at the time of their conclusion.
. / .The main contractors of the Siberian pipeline, a number of
major sub-contractors and suppliers as well as other exporters,
will suffer substantial economic and financial losses for which
no compensation is provided. For many sub-contractors who, for
the most part, have nothing to do with American goods or
technology for gas transport, the practical consequences of
the amendments will be particularly severe and may actually
force them out of business. Lay-offs of a considerable number
of workers will result in any case from the amendments.
28. The idea that compensation is due in case private
property or existing contracts are seriously affected by
government action is also familiar in the u. S. legal system.
If the U. S. Government takes private property by eminent
domain it has to compensate the owner. The Supreme Court has
indicated many times that, if regulatory legislation virtually
deprives a person of the complete use and enjoyment of his
property, the law of eminent domain ppplies. (14)
Justice Brandeis has written: "It is true that the police power
embraces regulations designed to promote public convenience or
the general welfare.. \ ~ut when particular individuals are
singled out to bear the cost of advancing the public convenience,
that imposition must bear some reasonable relation to the evils
to be eradicated or the advantages to be secured" (15) . It is
self-evident that for European contractors and sub-contractors
within the E.C. the cost imposed upon them by the amendments
does not bear a reasonable relation to the advantage of furthering
American export policy.
. /.
(14) Most recently in  Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 US 590
594 (1962).
(15)  Nashville et a1 v. Walters , 294 US  405 429 (1935)~ 19 -
29. This lack of provision  for  compensation or protection is
all the more disconcerting, because the Amendments of June 22
purport to regulate not merely  U.  s. external trade! 16) but
C.  external trade as well. Moreover, these are considerations
which obviously have played a role in the imposition of foreign
trade embargoes in the past: Firstly, both the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations (1981) and the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations (1979) exempted, to a large exten~ foreign incorp-
orated firms with ties to  s.  firms from otherwise stringent
or even absolute trade prohibitions. (17) Secondly, both the
trade embargo connected with the Iranian hostage crisis and the
embargo on grain shipments to the U. R. permitted existing
contracts to be honoured.
. / .
(16)  Buttfield v. Stranahan - 192  S.  470, 493 (1904)
indicates that insofar as it concerns 
U.  S. external
trade, it may be difficult to assert Fifth Amendment
rights.
(17) This is not to say that the E.C. agrees in principle with
.. the way in which these regulations handle the problem
of extraterritoriality.- 20 -
Conclusion
30. The European Community considers that the amendments to the
Export Administration Regulations of June 22, 1982 are unlawful
since they cannot be validly based on any of the generally accepted
bases of jurisdiction in international law. MoreoVer, insofar as
these amendments tend to enlist companies whose main ties are
to the E C. Member States for purposes of American trade policy
vis-a-vis the U. S .R., they constitute an unacceptable inter-
ference in the independent commercial policy of the E.C. Comparable
measures by third states have been rejected by the U. s. in the
past.
31. Even from the standpoint of u.s. law, the European Community
considers that the United .States ha$. not adopted a proper "balance
of interests" approach. The European Community further considers
tha t the amendments are of doubtful validity under the cri teria
of the Export Administration Act of 1979.
32. For these reasons, the European Community calls upon the
u . S. authorities to withdraw these measures.European Comm un i  .it...
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EC CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF
S. PIPELINE SANCTIONS
The European Community today delivered a note and legal comments to
the u. S. State and Commerce Departments on the new export
administration regulations issued by the U. S. Department of Commerce on June 22, 1982. The Department invited public comment on these
rules to be made before August 21. These documents were delivered
by Otto R. Borch, Ambassador of the Royal Danish Embassy,
representing the Presidency of the European Communities Council of
Ministers and Roland de Kergorlay, Head of Delegation of the
European Communities Commission. The complete text of the legal
comments is available from the European Communities Information
Service upon request.
The European Community wishes to. draw attention to the importance
that it attaches to the legal, political and economic aspects of the
United States ' measures, including their impact on the commercial
policy of the Community. As to the legal aspects, the European
Communi ty considers the U. S. measures contrary to international law, and apparently at variance with rules and principles Laid down in
U. S. law.
As to the political and economic aspects, it is clear that the U.
measures are liable to affect a wide variety of business activities
while their primary purpose is to delay the construction of the
pipeline to bring Soviet gas to Western Europe. The European Community holds that it is unlikely that the U.. S. measures will in fact delay materially the construction of the pipeline or the
del ivery of the gas.
The pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe can be completed using
Soviet technology and production capacity diverted from other parts
/. . 
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of their current program. Fu~thermore the recent U. S. measures
provide the Soviets with a strong inducement to enlarge their own
manufacturing capacity and to accelerate their own turbine and
compressor developments, thus becoming independent of Western sources. Gas could still flow to the Communi ty starting as
scheduled in 1984 owing to the existence of substantial spare
capaci ty in the existing pipeline system, sufficient to cover the
requirements of the early phases of the delivery program.
One of the main elements of the Community s policy of reducing the
vulnerability of its energy supply is based on diversification of sources. Gas from the Soviet Union will help to conserve the
Communi ty' s own stock of gas, oil and other fuels, and will reduce
the Community I s reliance on other foreign sources. Use of Siberian
gas will not create a dangerous dependence on that source. Even
when gas is flowing at the maximum rate, in 1990, it will represent
less that 4 per cent of the Community s total energy consumption.
Whatever the effects on the Soviet Union, the effects on European
Communi ty interests of the U. S. measures, applied retroactively and
without sufficient consultation, are unquestionably and seriously
damaging. Many companies interested as sub-contractors, or suppliers
of components, have made investments and committed productive
capacities to the pipeline project, well before the American measures
were taken. Though they may use no American technology, they will
suffer complete loss of business if the European contribution to the
project is blocked. Some of these companies may not survive. Major
European companies that can survive the immediate loss of business,
will nevertheless suffer from lower levels of capacity utilization
and loss of production and profits, while workers will be laid off
temporarily or permanently.
In the longer term, the European Community companies may be damaged
by the disruption of their contracts concluded in good faith, because
they may cease to be reliable suppliers in the eyes not only of the
Soviet Union, but also of their actual and potential business partners in other countries. One inevitable consequence would be to
call in question the usefulness of technological links between European
and American firms, if contracts could be nullified at any time by
decision of the U. S. administration. Another consequence to be feared
is that the claim of U. s. jurisdiction accompanying U. S. investment
will create a resistance abroad to the flow of U. S. investment. Thus,
these export control measures run counter to the policy aims of the
United States of easing the transfer of technology and of encouraging
free trade in general. There will be other far-reaching effects upon
business confidence. These measures thus add to the climate of
uncertainty that is already pervading the world economy as a whole.
The European Community therefore calls upon the United States
authori ties to withdraw these measures.
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